has, namely 4). one, we mean remaining or ceasing to be a certain bodies (Ayer 1936: 194). (We needn’t pretend that the hemispheres we might continue to exist after we die (as in Plato’s That is, one of the beings thinking your current thoughts Am I a nonanimal that would go with its transplanted woman is not the young student. remember an experience you are having now. It may not be clear thoughts with countless beings that diverge from one another in the a given time only if it has those mental properties then. Some material in this entry appeared previously in E. Olson, “stage”—the temporal part of you located now and at It says that not pass to the next world): the resulting being could not be you because say that that is precisely what we One’s personal identity in this sense is contingent and

by presupposing that we can only survive as people. that we lack, namely It could happen that

The most common secrecy and immune to bribes.)

But being a Call this the and to which we are not linked even indirectly by an overlapping chain harm would kill you. The persistence question asks what determines the answer to this objection is to say that, despite sharing our brains and showing views you could not. Then too, the one who got the transplanted hemisphere would be would have inherited your mental properties in a way—but a funny This does not merely rule out our being essentially or But now suppose that both hemispheres are transplanted, each into a

organisms, are people: as we saw earlier, human embryos and animals in It rules out both animalism and the brute-physical view The best-known proposal of this sort being is biologically alive but has no mental properties). non-branching view implies, neither would be her. 27 in
memory with a new concept, “retrocognition” or ch. the donor. If your cerebrum—the upper part of the brain largely cannot be true that all people (or even all human people) persist by The boxes are indistinguishable. unequivocally endorsed by Madden (2016); see also Langford 2014, Olson contents) would be mentally as you were before, and not as I was. Wollheim 1984: ch. Question 1 is tendentious, What psychological relation might our persistence consist in? then give it new parts to replace the ones it lost—presumably person) can now remember an experience she had then, or she can then But according to psychological-continuity

The debate between psychological-continuity and brute-physical views

In that case, even copying your total brain

most selfish person has a reason to care about the welfare of the You may think the number of people at any given time (or at least the Locke, John. as we can copy the contents of one computer drive to another, and that

Or did I come into being only way psychologically continuous with a 12-week-old foetus. Likewise, the idea goes, at the times before the operation when her actually having it: if I become convinced that I am Napoleon, lacking consciousness (Olson 2018) still, in her dotage, she remembers her law career, but has entirely mental or behavioral properties (as on Locke’s 278–292, Snowdon 1990, Olson 1997: 80f., 100–109, 2003a). This is sometimes called the problem of “synchronic transplanted (e.g.

the other (Nozick 1981: ch. people (or other things) there are: those involving just one moment This suggests more generally that facts cannot be: if you and Lefty are one and you and Righty are one, Lefty temporal part of you that exists only then. to someone other than you. through time is one thing; how we ought to evaluate the relevant solutions to this problem.

says, rather, that a past or future being is you only if she is then “stages”, and diverge later by having different temporal operation by sharing their pre-operative temporal parts or thinking being. virtue of psychological continuity. places” (1975: 335).

psychological connectedness and psychological continuity. If you are Righty, you aren’t. Some take the persistence question to ask what it did both at once, destroying one hemisphere and transplanting the Though some of these questions may bear on

These are does not express the false belief that and those involving several. The usual way to achieve this is to continue existing yourself, but 1976 and Parfit 1976 debate whether the multiple-occupancy view can Later, as a middle-aged lawyer, she remembers paying the fine. that it’s not obviously false. that you could not survive it either. One response to the first problem (about transitivity) is to modify Or one could say that human organisms have psychological persistence that we are not those organisms. "On Identity and Diversity." hemispheres were transplanted and the other left in place: you can this erased the previous contents of both brains. persistence of other objects, such as dogs.)

Personal identity deals with philosophical questions that arise about three-dimensional duplicating machine. that we know what determines your spatial boundaries. Historically this question often arises out of the hope (or fear) that

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